Arch. Min. Sci., Vol. 54 (2009), No 4, p. 739–752

Arch. Min. Sci., Vol. 54 (2009), No 4, p. 739–752
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Electronic version (in color) of this article is available: http://mining.archives.pl
PAWEŁ FRĄCZEK*, MACIEJ KALISKI**
THE DEREGULATION OF NATURAL GAS MARKETS AND ITS CONSEQUENCES
FOR GAS RECIPIENTS IN THE EU
LIBERALIZACJA RYNKU GAZU ZIEMNEGO I JEJ KONSEKWENCJE
DLA ODBIORCÓW GAZU W KRAJACH UE
Nowadays, activities aimed at introducing market mechanisms into the infrastructural branches of
the economy or regulating their operations are considered to be necessary. The aim of such activities is to
prevent an abuse of market position as well as lead to an effective allocation of resources, which is one of
the ways to boost market competitiveness. The paper discusses the main conditions for the liberalization
of gas industry with a particular emphasis on the changes in its functioning in the following years. The
main results of liberalization of natural gas market are presented as well as the results of this reform for
gas industry recipients.
Keywords: liberalization, regulation, natural gas market, gas recipients
W ostatnich dekadach XX wieku i w początku XXI wieku największy wpływ na funkcjonowanie
rynku gazu ziemnego miało wprowadzenie liberalizacji (deregulacji) tej branży. Jej celem było stworzenie
globalnego rynku gazu, na którym każdy uczestnik będzie mógł kupować lub sprzedawać każdą jego ilość,
wszędzie, w każdym kraju i w dowolnym momencie. Efektem tych zmian była m.in. likwidacja niedoboru
gazu na rozwiniętych rynkach gazu, zmniejszenie marży przedsiębiorstw gazowniczych, obniżenie cen
gazu i poprawa obsługi klientów korzystających z usług przedsiębiorstw gazowniczych, eliminowanie
z rynku dostawców, którzy w porównaniu z wynikami konkurentów, nie zdołali obniżyć kosztów dostawy
ani ograniczyć tempa wzrostu cen.
Liberalizacja gazownictwa wiąże się z dwoma rodzajami zmian:
• obszary branży, gdzie istnieje monopol naturalny (sieci przesyłowe i dystrybucyjne oraz magazyny
gazu), są poddawane regulacji chroniącej uczestników rynku przed nadmiernymi cenami oraz
uniemożliwiającej osiąganie przez monopol nadmiernych zysków,
• w tych obszarach branży, w których możliwe jest wykorzystywanie mechanizmów rynkowych
(wydobycie, handel), ogranicza się stosowanie instrumentów regulujących i tworzy warunki do
zaistnienia konkurencji.
*
**
RZESZÓW UNIVERSITY, AL. REJTANA 16C, 35-959 RZESZÓW, POLAND
AGH UNIVERSITY OF SCIENCES AND TECHNOLOGY, AL. MICKIEWICZA 30, 30-059 KRAKOW, POLAND
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Deregulacja sektora umożliwia nowym dostawcom wejście na rynek gazu poprzez dodatkowy import lub jego wydobycie przez nowe podmioty. Wejście nowych dostawców pozwala na wprowadzenie
konkurencji między podmiotami działającymi na danym rynku.
Warunkiem deregulacji jest stopniowe upowszechnienie zasady dostępu stron trzecich (TPA – Third
Part Acces) do sieci gazowych stanowiących własność działającego na danym terenie przedsiębiorstwa
dystrybucyjnego. Stosowanie tej zasady oznacza, że uprawnieni odbiorcy mogą kupować gaz u dowolnie
wybranego dostawcy, operator gazociągu musi zaś na zlecenie dostawcy przesłać gaz do odbiorcy. Wprowadzenie zasady TPA wymusza konkurencję wśród dostawców walczących o możliwość sprzedaży gazu
ze swych źródeł, a w konsekwencji prowadzi do obniżenia cen gazu dla klientów finalnych.
Warunkiem powstania i rozwoju konkurencyjnego rynku jest także możliwość pozyskania gazu przez
nowych uczestników rynku. Jest to możliwe dzięki wymuszeniu oddania dostępu do zasobów gazu przez
dotychczasowego monopolistę lub przez stworzenie warunków jego pozyskania z innych rynków poprzez
gazociągi przesyłowe lub dostawy LNG1. Pojawienie się nowych dostawców oznaczało konieczność
ograniczenia roli dotychczasowych, tradycyjnych dostawców gazu.
Do uelastycznienia rynku gazu przyczyniło się także ograniczenie przez państwo znaczenia kontraktów długoterminowych na dostawę gazu zawartych na podstawie formuły „bierz lub płać” (take or pay)2.
Pierwotnie zawierano je na wiele lat jako uzasadnienie celowości budowy oraz gwarancję finansowania
infrastruktury gazowniczej. Zmiany te pozwoliły na częściowe odejście od kontraktów długoterminowych
i stopniowe zastępowanie ich kontraktami średnio- i krótkoterminowymi. Likwidacja lub ograniczenie
udziału dostaw gazu opartych na kontraktach bierz lub płać w całkowitym zapotrzebowaniu na to paliwo
pozwala na realizację dostaw gazu przez niezależnych dostawców.
Mimo olbrzymiej roli regulacji i deregulacji gazownictwa dla konkurencyjności gospodarek poszczególne kraje UE są w bardzo różnym zakresie zaangażowane we wprowadzanie liberalnych zmian. Według
ostatniego raportu Komisji Europejskiej większość krajów unijnych jest zaawansowana w działaniach
służących wydzieleniu operatorów systemów przesyłowych i dystrybucyjnych, choć w dalszym ciągu
nie obserwuje się znaczących korzyści tych działań dla klientów końcowych.
Przejawem powolnego postępu zmian liberalizacyjnych w krajach UE jest niewielka skala zmian
dostawców przez odbiorców krajów członkowskich. W wielu krajach UE, mimo formalnego uwolnienia
rynku, obserwuje się opóźnienia w liberalizacji rynku gazu. Przejawem tego jest brak zmian dostawców.
Brak ten wiąże się z tym, że zmiana dostawcy jest postrzegana przez odbiorców energii jako skomplikowany proces. Z tego względu wielu klientów nie korzysta z tej zmiany, mimo że w rzeczywistości jest
to łatwiejsze niż obawy klientów.
Należy oczekiwać, że Komisja Europejska wymusi dokończenie liberalizacji branży gazowniczej.
Kraje, które nie dokończą zmian, będą narażone na postępowanie wyjaśniające przed Komisją Europejską
oraz na płacenie kar za zaniedbania. Również propozycje wprowadzania nowych wymogów unijnych
związanych z tzw. trzecim pakietem energetycznym zakładają dalsze prowadzenie działań liberalizujących
rynek gazu ziemnego w krajach UE.
Słowa kluczowe: liberalizacja, regulacja, rynek gazu ziemnego, odbiorcy gazu
1. Introduction
In the recent decades of the 20th century and the beginning of the 21st, the biggest
influence on the functioning of the natural gas market was its deregulation. The resulting
changes led to competition in the gas market (gas-on-gas competition), which involves
1
LNG – skroplony gaz ziemny (Liquefied Natural Gas).
Take or pay – kontrakt oznaczający konieczność systematycznego odbioru, umownie określonych ilości np.
gazu, pod rygorem zapłacenia za nieodebrany gaz. Ta forma umowy nie przewiduje możliwości zagospodarowywania
ewentualnych nadwyżek gazu (przykładowo w przypadku gwałtownego spadku zapotrzebowania), przez jego późniejszy
odbiór, reeksport lub odsprzedaż.
2
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gas producers, transportation services and ultimately should enable gas recipients to have
a free choice of supplier. Deregulation should lead to creating a global gas market, where
every market participant can buy or sell gas in any quantity, place, or country and at any
time. Some results of the changing situation have been observed in the elimination of gas
shortages in developed gas markets, reducing the profit margin of some gas companies,
lowering gas prices, improving customer service by gas companies, or eliminating such
suppliers from the market who, compared with other competitors, were no able to reduce
the cost of delivery or limit price hikes (Kaliski et al., 2008).
The premises for gas markets liberalisation in particular countries stem also from
the drawbacks of gas monopolies such as (Kamiński, 2005):
• uneconomical and ineffective performance of energy companies and as a result
loss covered by consumers or state budgets,
• limited access to investment capital in companies owned by the state,
• excessive growth of the production cost of electricity leading to higher prices for
final recipients
• inadequate level of service as perceived by natural gas recipients.
Reforms connected with the gas industry deregulation induced competition in the
market. The competition started among both gas producers and ancillary delivery services and, consequently, aims at giving gas recipients a free choice of gas
supplier3.
The liberalisation of gas industry is connected with two types of changes:
• the areas of industry where natural monopoly exists (gas transmission and distribution systems and gas storage facilities) are regulated to ensure that the market
participants are protected from too high prices and that the monopoly is prevented
from making excessive profits,
• in those areas of industry where it is possible to take advantage of market mechanisms (extraction, trade) the use of regulatory instruments is limited and the
conditions for competition are created.
Some of the most important actions liberalising the gas industry are as follows
(Łucki, 2003):
1. Prohibiting transmission and storage companies from gas trading.
2. Providing unrestrained access to gas infrastructure (TPA).
3. Introducing competitive tenders before signing a contract for transmission or
storage services.
4. Introducing the possibility of re-selling the services specified in the contract, to
other subjects (creating a secondary market of services).
3
Efforts at liberalizing the infrastructural sectors often meet with criticism. They reality shows, however, that the
policy of free market of energy resources helps reduce unexpected price hikes and limits the risk of an energy crisis.
Progressive gas market deregulation, thanks to new entrants in the branch, has led to lower purchasing prices for power
plants. Thus the cost of electrical energy has decreased. The views of gas deregulation critics can be read in Łucki
(2003).
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5. Separating the areas of activity in order to achieve cost transparency.
6. Introducing control over payments for gas transmission and storage (such payments should reflect outlays and costs incurred with a moderate rate of return).
7. Ensuring access to information on the activities of gas companies.
8. Appointing an office of gas policy regulation.
The sector deregulation facilitates the appearance of new suppliers in the market by
means of additional gas imports or through its extraction by new entities. In a traditionally shaped energy market, its particular areas were served by one supplier who enjoyed
exclusivity and established the prices. The price was usually a sum of production costs,
transmission costs and a profit. This price proposal was then accepted by a relevant state
office. One feature of this model was its focus on safeguarding a continued delivery of
energy which was necessary for the economic development. The entrance of new suppliers creates competition between market participants (Frączek, 2008b).
A further stage of deregulation was a gradual extension of the TPA (TPA – Third
Party Access) rule to gas networks owned by a particular distribution company operating in a given area. Taking advantage of TPA means that eligible recipients can buy gas
from a supplier of their choice while the gas pipeline operator has to deliver gas to the
recipient as ordered by the supplier. In return for the gas delivery, the recipient is obliged
to pay a fee which is related to tariffs for transmission services (Rotko, 2004).
The introduction of TPA rule creates competition among suppliers who fight for
the possibility of selling gas from their sources, which in turn leads to lower gas prices
for the final customers. At present, gas is sold at many commodity exchange markets
and it is the market that shapes its price. In such conditions, some of the companies in
the gas market trade only in access to their networks and not specifically in selling gas
(Bobińska, 2000).
Another condition necessary for establishing and developing a competitive market
is also the possibility to extract gas by new market entrants. It is possible thanks to the
fact that the monopolist is forced to renounce its access to gas resources or due to the
possibility of taking gas from other markets via gas transmission systems or deliveries
of liquefied natural gas (LNG). The appearance of new suppliers means that the role of
traditional suppliers must be limited.
A further factor helps to make the gas market more flexible – the fact that the state
reduced the significance of long-term contracts for gas delivery, which were signed on
”take or pay” basis. Initially, they were concluded for many years as a justification of
the purposefulness of constructing the gas infrastructure and as a financial guarantee.
Such changes helped to partially eliminate long-term contracts and to gradually replace
them with medium-term and short-term ones. The reduction in the amount of gas deliveries based on the ‘take or pay’ contracts in total demand for this fuel, enables gas to be
delivered by independent suppliers.
Limiting the role of long-term contracts contributed to setting up gas exchanges
and to popularising new forms of contracts for gas delivery. Some of these contracts
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are based on fixed term contracts known in financial markets. This helps to reduce the
operational risk within the industry.
Simultaneously, despite the liberalisation of the market, one may observe an increase
in energy prices for the consumers. Research carried out by the European Commission
shows that this increase is connected with limited accessibility of energy carriers (Horizontal..., 2004). It may be assumed that in time, as a result of adaptation activities and
the appearance of new suppliers, there will be a balance in the market and then supply
will outstrip demand, which in consequence will lead to a reduction in prices.
2. The role of market regulators in gas liberalisation
The regulating and deregulating activities are carried out with the participation of
regulatory offices (the so-called regulators), which are independent institutions called
to support competition in the sector. Among their tasks is the implementation of EU
directives with respect to the gas industry and the control of gas market liberalisation.
The institutions should help create a single common market and facilitate an exchange
of experience between the regulators. The regulators’ tasks involve, amongst others
(Parker, 1999; Ocana, 2003):
• carrying out activities aimed at lowering prices of services provided by the regulated companies,
• specifying the level of profitability of the regulated companies – this level must
guarantee the return on the capital which will be appropriate to the risk taken and
must not be lower than the market average,
• creating conditions for new subjects to enter the industry by reducing restriction
on this entrance by the existent dominant suppliers,
• forcing the improvement of the quality of services (such activities must be separated from the issue of forcing a fall in prices for customers),
• taking into consideration social aspects while setting the prices for customers
(in particular, a regulator should reduce the consequences of a price increase for
customers while carrying out activities aimed at reducing cross-subsidizing),
• specifying which areas of the industry are the actual natural monopolies and
which will be suitable for creating environment for competition.
The work of market regulators contributes to ensuring the transparency of the
regulated companies, forcing their effectiveness as well as lowering the prices of the
products offered.
Appointing the regulators will reduce the role of the state in the gas industry and
lower the cost of operating the regulated industry for its final customers. Thereby, it will
affect the competitiveness of the EU energy sector. Additionally, in order to coordinate
the EU regulatory policy, twice a year there are meetings at Madrid Forum, in which
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regulatory institutions participate and it gives them the opportunity to exchange their
experiences in the field.
Regulators’ work must be based on the analysis of the companies’ costs which
constitute the basis for a regulation. One of the most difficult tasks which must be done
by the regulatory institutions is deciding which areas of the regulated industry operate
as natural monopolies and specifying those areas which may be potentially described as
competitive. Such distinction determines the range of regulatory activities.
3. Gas liberalisation in the EU countries
Initially, the scope of operations deregulating the European gas market resulted
from directive 98/30/CE (Table 1).
TABLE 1
The fundamental requirements of the directive 98/30/CE
Requirement
Way and deadline of realization
Full implementation
By 10 August 2000
Allowing third parties
The possibility of choice between negotiated access and regulated
to access the infrastrucaccess.
ture
All producers of electricity using natural gas as fuel, regardless of
Customers eligible for
yearly consumption. Other recipients (distributors and consumers)
accessing the network
consuming: in 2000 over 25 million m3/year, in 2003 over 15 milas third party
lion m3/year and in 2008 over 5 million m3/year.
The level of gas market In 2000: 20% of domestic consumption, in 2003: 28% of domestic
opening (schedule)
consumption and in 2008: 33% of domestic consumption.
Separation of particular Separating the accounts for gas transmission, distribution and stortypes of activity
age as well as for the operations outside the gas sector.
Appointing the regulatory office in order to regulate, control, ensure
Regulation of the gas
transparency and prevent the abuse of the dominant market posiindustry
tion.
Appointing an unbiased body which will, among other things, deal
Settling disputes
with the issues concerning denied access to the network.
Gas companies must care for the general aspects: security of supPublic service obligaply, regularity, quality and price of supply and environment protections
tion.
Exceptions (departures)
Gas distribution, gasification of the new areas, the markets isolated
from the decisions of
from the West-European market, the newly established markets.
the directive
Source: Łucki, 2003, p. 255.
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A directive 2003/55/EC forces faster liberalisation of the EU gas market. It anticipates the following actions:
1. Opening of the gas market (after 1.07.2004 all recipients apart from households
became eligible recipients; after 1.07.2007 all recipients will become eligible).
2. Obligatory use of regulated access to the network/grid in the EU countries, which
means that managing companies have to work out and confirm tariffs regulating
the rules and prices of access to grids. Such a solution is convenient for new
market entrants because:
• it enables them to avoid time-consuming negotiations with grid owners about
the conditions of the access,
• there are specific cases in which a company is allowed, given the regulator’s
consent, to refuse the rendering of transmission services. According to article
21.1 of directive 2003/55/EC- this could happen in the case of a lack of transmission capacity or wherever access to the system would prevent a company from
carrying out the public service obligations which are assigned to them or on the
basis of serious economic and financial difficulties with take-or-pay contracts.
3. Separation of trade activities from transmission activities in gas companies (unbundling) – according to the guidelines of the European Commission, requires
a legal unbundling or ownership unbundling. However, unbundling of accounts
or managerial unbundling is not allowed. At the same time, the so-called implementation notes (The unbundling regime..., 2003) to the directive 2003/55/EC,
postponed the deadline for legal unbundling until 1.07.2007. The introduction
of unbundling is aimed at reducing cross-subsidizing (Slot, 2000, p. 60). Specification of costs in particular areas of business constitutes a basis for their strict
control and for reducing their growth in the next years.
4. Designation of system operators by gas companies managing the systems of grids.
This process will consist of 2 stages:
• until 1.07.2004, transmission system operators were designated in the EU
countries and dealt with the exploitation of transmission systems,
• until 1.07.2004, distribution system operators were designated, which administered the distribution systems.
The directive 2003/55/EC for designation of transmission systems operators and
distribution system operators states that:
• persons responsible for the management of the transmission system may not
participate in a vertically integrated energy enterprise that supervises the work
of gas transmission network,
• appropriate measures must be taken to ensure that the professional interests of
persons responsible for the management of the transmission system are taken
into account in a manner that ensures their independent action,
• safeguarding effective decision-making rights, independent from the integrated
gas enterprise.
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Both systems may be owned by one subject. However, it is important that they
enjoyindependent decision-making. The operators have the following tasks: balancing
supply and demand, forecasting the demand and the flexibility of deliveries, ensuring
the quality of overhaul services, working out rules and procedures for equal access to
transmission and distribution systems and storage facilities, taking into account conditions
justifying the refusal of access to grids (transmission and distribution networks)4.
It was only in Great Britain that the market deregulation led to a complete liberalisation of the British gas market and the market was ready to open as early as 19985. This
was possible due to the privatisation of British Gas, which until 1982 was a monopolist
in the British gas market. The emergence of a competing gas market in Great Britain
made it possible to reduce gas prices for recipients, improved services and limited the
risk of interrupted delivery6.
The implementation of gas directives in the EU countries faced a lot of difficulties.
The current, relatively slow development of competition in the gas market results from
(Technical..., 2005; Evaluation..., 2007):
• limited number of gas suppliers – Russia, Norway and Algeria currently provide
approx. 70% of natural gas imported by the EU,
• concentration of gas deliveries, manifesting itself in a large share of three biggest
wholesale suppliers in the structure of gas deliveries,
• gradual consolidation of the companies in the energy sector, leading to lower
competition in the sector,
• maintaining long term contracts for gas delivery,
• territorial limits for gas trade,
• difficulties in accessing the capacity of gas transmission pipelines, due to the fact
that the incumbent gas companies are in charge of them, and limiting access to
information on free transmission capacities,
• lack of information on the use of gas storage facilities– the rule “first come, first
served” discriminates against new market entrants,
• the fact that the majority of recipients perceive the change of supplier as an operation which is risky and does not bring the expected results,
• regulated prices leading to maintaining cross-subsidizing of the household recipients by industrial recipients,
• ineffective unbundling– lack of independence of market participants after implementing the legal unbundling, which points to the need for further efforts towards
gas unbundling in EU,
• high concentration of the sector companies and significant influence of state
institutions on them,
• dominant position of the biggest gas market participants in the whole gas market,
4
5
6
See more Frączek (2008a).
In Great Britain the gas market was liberalized even before adopting the directive 98/30/CE.
The process of gas market liberalization in Great Britain is described in Jasiński el al., 1995.
747
• lack of clear information on market operations, which inhibits competition and
reduces the free choice of supplier by final consumers,
• lack of clarity in tariffs and how they are prepared, which limits competition
among market participants.
In order to introduce competition in the EU gas market, the following actions are
suggested (Technical annex…, 2005):
• following the rule “use it or lose it” in assuring access to gas storage facilities,
which will enhance transparency of the companies that are dominant in the market
and facilitate access to these facilities for new market entrants,
• developing the market of gas delivery by promoting LNG technology in transportation of natural gas,
• implementing the sector directives, focusing on the introduction of unbundling
(the European Commission will deal with the states which have failed to follow
the directives),
• boosting the independence of market regulators and providing them with legal
instruments which will help to force the implementation of the directive decisions
related to the sector,
• taking steps by the regulators in order to ensure non-discriminatory access to the
grid and the use of fair balancing rules,
• carrying out activities by Member States, aimed at removing administrative barriers, liberating capacity, introducing transparency and presenting requirements
for access to the grid,
• developing cross-border connections between Member States,
• supporting market regulators in their activities aimed at finding new traders.
Despite the vital role of market regulation, individual EU countries are engaged
to varying degrees in the introduction of liberal changes. According to a recent report
(Report..., 2009) most of the EU countries are advanced in the process of unbundling
network and supply interests even though no significant benefits for the final consumers
have been observed yet.
The slow progress of deregulation in the EU is also visible in the relatively infrequent change of suppliers by respective EU recipients. A bigger scale of change has been
observed only among industrial and non-industrial recipients in Hungary, Spain and
Denmark. In many EU countries, despite freeing the market, the liberalisation process
is visibly delayed. This is proved by no changes of suppliers (Report..., 2009, p. 8).
One of the main factors inhibiting the liberalisation process is a large concentration of
suppliers in the European gas market. In most EU countries, gas is supplied by dominant
companies or the number of suppliers is severely limited and the fact that a huge share
of the market is in the hands of three biggest companies points to a significant barrier
in the development of the gas market (Report..., 2009, p. 17). Since it is not possible to
change a supplier, many clients stop looking for a new one.
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Research commissioned by the European Commission points out that a change
of supplier is seen by energy recipients to be a very complicated process. That is why
a large number of customers do not take advantage of changing their supplier despite the
fact that such a change is, in fact, much easier than they believe (Consumers’..., 2008).
Coincidentally, 69% of the customers who did change a supplier claim that this helped
them significantly reduce the cost of natural gas delivery (Table 2).
TABLE 2
Eurobarometer survey FL243 on consumer perception on switching
Gas (total)
Usage
Comparison of offers: very & fairly difficult
Consumers who switched
Consumers who got a cheaper price after switching (low sample size!)
Did not switch (because): “current provider offers the best value for money“
‘Did not switch (because): “no alternative local provider“
Switching facilitators: cost free switching
Switching facilitators: “standardized comparable offers from providers“
‘Switching facilitators: “a website that tells which provider is the cheapest
for you“
Recent changes in prices: increases
69%
28%
7%
69%
27%
19%
27%
26%
24%
64%
Source: Report..., 2009, p. 11.
It shall be expected that the European Commission will force the completion of
gas industry liberalisation, which entails following the decisions of the new Gas Directive by legislative as well as executive bodies of the Member States. The states which
will not complete the changes, run the risk of explanatory proceedings to the European
Commission and of being financially penalized. Therefore, it cannot be expected that
the states trying to slow down the implementation of the decisions of the new Gas Directive, will avoid putting them into practice. Also, suggestions for following new EU
requirements related to the third energy package should contribute to the EU gas market
liberalisation (Ciszewski, 2009).
4. Gas market liberalisation in Poland
Poland, as an EU member, has to work towards the liberalisation of its natural gas
market. This entails following 98/30/EC and 2003/55/EC directives in the resolutions of
its Act on Energy Law (Prawo energetyczne) and in secondary legislation. Such regulations led to formal opening of the gas market in Poland. Since 1.01.2004 32 recipients,
using annually more than 15 million cubic metres of gas gained the opportunity to apply
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to PGNiG SA for access to the grid, in line with TPA rule. The opening of the market for
those recipients is connected with meeting deadlines accepted by Poland with regard to
gas market liberalisation. The number of recipients eligible for TPA rule has increased
with the implementation of the directive 2003/55/CE, i.e. since 1.07.2004. The amended
directive and the new definition of the eligible recipient caused a dramatic increase in
the number of eligible recipients for transmission services. Their number was estimated
at 176 000, which meant a 67% opening (Dworak, 2003, p. 22).
Until then, Poland did not take advantage of TPA rule despite the fact that several
companies met the quantity requirement. There was one entity in 2000 that applied for
access to the grid and PGNiG SA refused the transmission service. The following years
did not see delivery on TPA basis either. This clearly shows weak state supervision and
an inefficiency of the ERO (Energy Regulatory Office) president who should facilitate
the opening of the domestic gas market. This lack of TPA deliveries is a serious setback
to competition in the gas market.
In order to open the gas market it was necessary to conduct some preparatory work
such as (Dworak, 2003, p. 22):
− provision of technical conditions for balancing and calculating of gas delivered
on TPA basis,
− development and implementation of legal regulations allowing for the functioning
of market with freed prices,
− preparation and implementation of transmission tariffs,
− development and implementation of a grid code which would regulate the principles of participation in the system by entities interested in TPA rules.
The difficulty of calculating gas delivered on TPA basis results from the fact that
the gas pressure reduction and metering stations owned by PGNiG SA will become
metering points for deliveries. This necessitates creating conditions for operating gas
transmission. Metering the domestic gas system will be a huge investment. By obtaining
information on the amount of transmitted gas, eligible companies will be able to access
the grid. It is also necessary to develop and implement a calculating system in order to
define the cost of delivery and the way of financing grid operations. For the market to
be open it is important to define the technical capacity of gas transmission in particular
networks segments. This will form the basis for programmed transmission in accordance
with TPA rules, via the existing infrastructure.
By implementing 2003/55/EC Directive in PGNiG SA, the bookkeeping of particular
operations was separated since several companies of the Capital Group had kept their
own ledgers. Further separation process will be connected with the implementation of
2003/55/EC Directive.
After full market opening, PGNiG SA (in accordance with the directive 2003/55/EC)
will have to give access to their networks to any interested entity from the EU. It can
be expected that the European Commission will not justify a refusal to access the grid
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as there are conditions for delivering gas to recipients, the company is in good financial
standing and there is a large, 60% share of imported gas in its total consumption, which
points to the possibility of additional supplies. It needs to be emphasized though that
problems in short-term supply to the Polish market observed in the past indicate that only
few entities are ready to enter the domestic gas market (Rychlicki & Siemek, 2008).
The lack of gas supply security in Poland means smaller benefits from gas liberalisation for its end users. Consequently, it will impede activities aiming at increasing the role
of gas in the structure of energy sources thereby reducing the level of gas emissions and
air pollution (Kaliski et al., 2009). This would mean a failure to meet the requirements
resulting from the energy and climate package. Ultimately, Poland’s economic development can suffer and the country would risk staying far behind the old EU countries.
The liberalisation of the natural gas market which is induced by EU directives will
decrease the role of coal (Kamiński, 2005, 2009). Market mechanisms should therefore
shape the structure of energy sources in Poland. Furthermore, deregulation of the gas
market should be accompanied by less and less frequent cross-subsididizing of coal
(Frączek, 2008a). Altogether, this would increase price competitiveness in natural gas
and, in consequence, lead to increased energy security of Poland.
5. Summary
To summarize the considerations of the gas sector Liberalisation in the EU countries
it needs to be emphasized that:
1. There are considerable discrepancies in the involvement of EU countries with
regard to the implementation of liberalisation reforms.
2. Because of the slow reform implementation by some members of the EU, gas
recipients do not enjoy the benefits that should accompany the deregulation
process.
3. There is little engagement of many countries’ regulatory institutions and governments in the liberalisation process, which is proved by the fact that the respective
recipients do not change suppliers.
4. Various surveys point to low awareness on the part of the recipients regarding:
• the possibility of changing a supplier,
• the potential benefits of changing a supplier.
5. The lack of progress in the liberalisation of EU gas markets visibly affects them
by weakening their competitive advantage.
6. So far the activities towards gas liberalisation have had a low impact on Poland’s
economic competitive advantage and have not really equalled the standards of
living between Poland and other EU countries.
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7. Some companies in Poland meet the eligibility requirements as far as transmission services are concerned, however, legal regulations in this respect are only
dead letters.
8. Work on Poland’s deregulation of gas market is in progress.
9. It is to be expected that the European Commission will enforce the TPA rules in
Poland since PGNiG SA cannot formally refuse access to the grid.
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Received: 12 August 2009